Tech Reports
ULCS-08-006
Value-Based Arguments in the Dictator Game
Abstract
In this paper we use an approach to modelling reasoning in a simple scenario from experimental economics, called the Dictator Game, using preferences over social values to provide transparent justification of actions. Our approach to decision making here does not require estimation of utilities and weights for different factors and can thus allow preferences to emerge from the reasoning. Using this model we can explain the behaviour of subjects in such experiments, and, in particular, gain insight into the framing effect observed by some experimenters.
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